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Interest groups advocating rights of sexual minorities' have been
lobbying international organizations for years without success.2 A
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water at the Critical Legal Conference 2000, held in Helsinki in September, 2000. I would also like
to thank Jo Murkens for his able assistance in the preparation of this piece, along with Deirdre
Fottrell, Douglas Sanders and Rob Wintemute for their helpful comments.
1. Definitions for terms such as "sexual orientation" and "sexual minority" remain indeter-
minate, as sexual norms vary over time and from one culture to the next. Moreover, the term
"sexual minority" raises questions about the degree of collective cohesiveness that must exist in
order to justify minority status. I have argued elsewhere that, for the specific purposes of human
rights law, these issues do not in fact create greater obstacles for defining categories of sexual ori-
entation than they do for defining such categories as race, ethnicity or religion. See ERIc HEINZE,
SEXUAL ORIENTATION: A HUMAN RIGHT, 50-58, 243-57 (1995) [hereinafter HEINZE, SEXUAL
ORIENTATION]; Eric Heinze, The Construction and Contingency of the Minority Concept, in MI-
NORITY AND GROUP RIGHTS IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM (Deirdre Fottrell & Bill Bowring, eds.) 25,
62-72 (1999) [hereinafter Heinze, Construction]. For purposes of this essay, these terms can be
understood as referring to sexual identities or behaviors which are widely deemed to depart from a
dominant, "normative heterosexuality." Id. at 31-49, 60-62.
2. See, e.g., Douglas Sanders, Getting Lesbian and Gay Issues on the International
Human Rights Agenda, 18 HUM. RTS. Q. 67 (1996); Douglas Sanders, Kurt Krickler &
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standard explanation for that failure is that human sexuality is
something complex, even mysterious, which requires that international
organizations proceed with special caution.'
In this essay, it will be argued that such an explanation amounts to a
self-fulfilling prophecy. Sexual orientation is neither more nor less
complex than many other issues, such as race, ethnicity, religion or gen-
der, which have nevertheless found wide recognition within leading
intergovernmental organizations. It is not because sexual orientation is
uniquely complex or mysterious that it is barred from the UN's human
rights agenda. Rather, it is precisely that kind of persistent exclusion
that keeps the issue of sexual orientation mystified, perpetuating the
impression that it is uniquely complex.
It is nothing new to invoke myths of the mystical to deny rights.
Pre-colonial African, American and Asian peoples were depicted as
mystical inhabitants of irrational worlds, better suited to regimes of
(European) moral and religious conditioning than to equal participation
as subjects of law.' Similarly, the Victorian woman was depicted as a
complex and mysterious being. Her needs and concerns raised "deeply
moral" and "deeply religious" issues, better suited to the gentle touch of
ethical sensibility than to the iron fist of legal rights and duties.5 In the
same way, questions of sexual orientation are maintained in a perpetual
pre-dawn of "deeply held" moral and religious beliefs that require
"delicacy" and "caution."
In this essay, it will be argued that sexual minorities have become
pawns in what will be called the international "sensitivity game." The
game has two rules. First, autocratic regimes bolster their domestic
authority by promoting nationalist campaigns based on ideals of moral
(i.e., sexual) purity, which portray minority sexual orientations as mani-
festations of Western decadence. Those ideals are depicted as stemming
from "ancient traditions," which, however, have little basis in historical
fact. Meanwhile, Western States are eager to show that they are not
steam-rolling a global agenda over "traditional" societies. Welcoming
the opportunity to show how sensitive they are to "ancient" beliefs, they
decline to insist on rights for sexual minorities.
This essay is divided into two parts. Part One examines develop-
ments thus far under existing international instruments. We shall see
that sexual minorities have indeed won some recognition, but it has
Rodney Croome, Finding a Place in International Law (July 20, 1997), http:// www.ilga.org/
Information/ international/finding-a-place-in-intemational.htm.
3. See infra Section II.C.
4. See, e.g., PETER FIZPATRICK, THE MYTHOLOGY OF MODERN LAW 17-29 (1992).
5. See, e.g., KATE MILLET, SEXUAL POLITICS 124-51 (1970).
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come either at an unduly late stage or within institutional structures that
leave such recognition largely ineffective. Part Two explores whether
greater strides can be made within the more political human rights bod-
ies of intergovernmental organizations-notably, the United Nations-
toward the drafting of an instrument expressly directed at rights for sex-
ual minorities. It will be argued that the international sensitivity game
largely precludes such measures.
I. DEVELOPMENTS UNDER INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS
According to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948
(UDHR),
Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in
this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race,
colour sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, na-
tional or social origin, property, birth or other status.6
That passage provides a standard, contemporary statement of the
non-discrimination norm. Unlike older formulations, as found, for ex-
ample, in the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution,7
this passage has two crucial features. First, it includes an express enu-
meration of protected categories ("race, colour, sex . . ."). Second, it
includes an "other status" clause that, prima facie, envisages the incor-
poration of "unenumerated" categories. One strategy for sexual
minorities seeking recognition in international law has been to seek ac-
knowledgment of sexual orientation as a "new" category.
A. The European Convention of Human Rights
To date, the most detailed case law on point has arisen under the
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).8 Article 14 of the
Convention follows article 2 of the Universal Declaration, 9
6. G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948).
7. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (providing that "[n]o State shall ... deny to any per-
son within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws").
8. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4,
1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953) [hereinafter ECHR], amended by
Protocol No. 3 (1970), No. 5 (1971), No. 8 (1990), and No. 11 (1998). For developments
within the European Union, see Sanders, Krickler, & Croome, supra note 2.
9. Cf. ECHR, supra note 8, pmbl. para. 5 (noting the purpose of the Convention to give
effect to rights inscribed in the Universal Declaration). See also P. VAN DIJK & G.J.H. VAN
HOOF, THEORY AND PRACTICE OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 1-2 (3rd
ed. 1998) (noting the emergence of the European Convention out of the Universal Declara-
tion).
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The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Con-
vention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground
such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other
opinion, national or social origin, association with a national
minority, property, birth or other status.
The original text of the Convention provided for the European
Commission of Human Rights and the European Court of Human Rights
as the bodies principally responsible for supervising State compliance.'
When the Commission and Court began interpreting article 14, they
might have adopted an attitude of restraint vis-A-vis the "other status"
clause. The scope of "new" categories being, arguably, limitless, they
might have read the clause as dead letter, on the view that only the
States Parties should have the authority to introduce new categories, by
amendment or protocol.
That is not the view they adopted, however. The Strasbourg bodies
have deemed the enumeration of categories in such provisions to be
"illustrative" rather than "exhaustive," thus justifying the recognition of
new categories." For example, in Marckx v. Belgium,'2 the Court held
that the Convention prohibits discrimination against unmarried moth-
ers-not a specifically enumerated category within article 14. In Inze v.
Austria,'3 the Court held that article 14 prohibits discrimination against
children born out of wedlock.
Over the past 20 years, the Court and Commission have made prog-
ress towards recognizing sexual orientation as a protected category,
albeit with great hesitation. In 1981, in Dudgeon v. United Kingdom,
4
the Court, departing from Commission findings in earlier cases,'5 held
that a prohibition of consensual, adult homosexual conduct violated the
10. ECHR, supra note 8, art. 19. The Commission was abolished under Protocol 11,
which provided for a commensurate expansion of the role of the Court as principal supervi-
sory body for the Convention. See Protocol 11 to the ECHR, Restructuring the Control
Machinery Established Thereby, 1994 E.T.S. 155 (entered into force Nov. 1, 1998). See also
ECHR, supra note 8, art. 32, I (providing, before entry into force of Protocol 11, that the
Committee of Ministers was to decide whether there had been a violation of the Convention
in cases not referred to the Court).
11. See MARC BOSSUYT, L'INTERDICTION DE LA DISCRIMINATION DANS LE DROIT INTER-
NATIONAL DES DROITS L'HOMME 56-66 (1976); Eric Heinze, Equality: Between Hegemony
and Subsidiarity, 52 REV. INT'L COMM'N JURISTS 56, 62-63 (1994). Cf Kjeldsen v. Den-
mark, 23 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), at para. 56 (1976)(stating that article 14 "prohibits ...
discriminatory treatment having at its basis or reason a personal characteristic ('status') by
which persons or groups of persons are distinguishable from each other").
12. 31 Eur. Ct. H. R. (ser. A) at 8 (1979).
13. 126 Eur. Ct. H. R. (ser. A) at 11 (1987).
14. 45 Eur. Ct. H. R. (ser. A) at 18 (1981).
15. See HEINZE, SEXUAL ORIENTATION, supra note 1, at 98-99. See also VAN DIJK &
VAN HOOF, supra note 9, at 496-97.
[Vol. 22:283
Sexual Orientation and International Law
right to privacy under article 8.16 Finding the dispute sufficiently re-
solved under the privacy right, the Court deemed it unnecessary to
examine whether there had been a violation of the non-discrimination
right. 7 A decade later, in B v. France,8 the Court held that States Parties
must take certain minimum steps toward recognizing the sex reassign-
ment of post-operative transsexuals. That case, too, was decided only
with reference to article 8. The result of these cases was that the Court
was able to reach decisions in favor of the individual applicants, while
avoiding the question of whether sexual orientation or identity should be
recognized as a new category within the scope of article 14.
In the more recent case of Sutherland v. United Kingdom9, the
Commission, examining a British law that set a higher age of consent
for male homosexual acts than for heterosexual acts, was unable to
avoid that question. The complaint was not that individuals were denied
the right to engage in homosexual conduct, but only that they faced dis-
crimination, through the higher age of consent, in their enjoyment of it.
The Commission noted that the law could be deemed discriminatory in
two senses. It could be seen as discriminatory against homosexuals,
which would warrant the recognition of sexual orientation as a distinct
category. Alternatively, it could be viewed as discriminating on the ba-
sis of the sex of the participants, in which case it could fall under the
already enumerated category of "sex." The Commission found that it
was unnecessary to choose between these two interpretations, as either
would yield a finding of discrimination." Most recently, in Salgeuiro da
Silva Mouta v. Portugal,' the Court, sitting in chamber, 2 found that the
decision of a Portuguese court to refuse child custody to the applicant
16. Article 8 provides that "[elveryone has the right to respect for his private and family
life, his home and his correspondence." ECHR, supra note 8, art. 8, q 1.
17. Dudgeon, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 26. Cf. VAN DUK & VAN HOOF, supra note 9,
at 716-18. But see Dudgeon, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 32, (Evrigenis, J. and Garcia de
Enterria, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court should have found a violation of article 14).
18. 232-C Eur. Ct. H. R. (ser. A) (1992).
19. App. No. 25186/94, 24 Eur. H.R. Rep. (Comm'n Supp.) C.D. at 22 (1997).
20. Id. at 30. On the question which of these two categories is more appropriate for sex-
ual minorities, see Heinze, Sexual Orientation, supra note 1, at 216-20.
21. App. No. 33290/96 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 1999), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/
hudoc/ (last visited Mar. 2, 2001).
22. After the entry into force of Protocol 11, a party to a dispute "may, in exceptional
cases, request that the case be referred to the Grand Chamber," which consists of 17 judges.
ECHR, supra note 8, art. 27, art. 43. A panel of judges of the Grand Chamber "shall accept
the request if the case raises a serious question affecting the interpretation or application of
the Convention ... or a serious issue of general importance." ECHR, supra note 8, art. 43(2).
The fact that no such referral was made in this case suggests that the question of sexual ori-
entation as a protected category under article 14 was no longer deemed sufficiently dubious
or controversial to require submission to the Grand Chamber.
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because of the applicant's homosexuality constituted discrimination on
grounds of sexual orientation.23
At first glance, these developments seem favorable. The Court
opinion in Dudgeon appeared to give sexual minorities reason for opti-
mism, stating,
There is now a better understanding, and in consequence an in-
creased tolerance, of homosexual behaviour to the extent that in
the great majority of the member States of the Council of
Europe it is no longer considered to be necessary or appropriate
to treat homosexual practices of the kind now in question as in
themselves a matter to which the sanctions of the criminal law
should be applied .... 24
In reaching that view, the Court referred to its dictum in the case of
Tyrer v. United Kingdom that "the Convention is a living instrument
which... must be interpreted in the light of present-day conditions."25
That doctrine of "evolving consensus" (also referred to as the doctrine
of "European consensus," "evolutive interpretation" or "dynamic inter-
pretation")26 appears progressive, insofar as the Court seems to reject
any "originalist" premise of limiting the interpretation of the Conven-
tion to the intentions of the drafters.
In practice, however, the doctrine has done little to promote the
rights of sexual minorities. Where social attitudes do not appear suffi-
ciently evolved, the Court can cite the doctrine to deny rights of sexual
orientation or identity altogether. By the time social attitudes have suffi-
ciently evolved, the Court merely uses it to recognize rights that, for
individuals in many member States, are no longer needed.27 Far from
developing protections against majority sentiments-which is, suppos-
edly, a central purpose of human rights-the Court largely endorses
them. In the foregoing passage, the Court itself admits that, by the time
sexual minorities had finally found favor in its eyes, law reform had
23. By contrast, in Lustig-Prean and Beckett v. United Kingdom, 29 Eur. H.R. Rep. 548
(1999), concerning the dismissal of military officers on grounds of homosexuality, the Court,
as in Dudgeon, found in favor of the applicants, but only on the basis of article 8. That result
may suggest a continuing preference on the part of the Court to address the question of dis-
crimination only as a last resort. See also A.D.T. v. United Kingdom, App. No. 35765/97
(Eur. Ct. H.R. 2000), available at http://www.hudoc.echr.coe.int/hudoc (last visited Mar. 5,
2000).
24. Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H. R. at 23, para. 60 (1981).
25. 26 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), at 15 (1978).
26. See, e.g., DAVID J. HARRIS ET AL., LAW OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN
RIGHTS 7-11, 294-96 (1995).
27. Cf. ROBERT WINTEMUTE, SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS 138-40
(1995).
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already been completed in most member States. Before those domestic
reforms had taken place-at the time when gays might genuinely have
benefited from the succor which international regimes promise-the
Court and Commission were silent.
28
Thus, far from challenging prevailing social norms, the "evolving
consensus" doctrine makes them a deciding factor. 9 The precedent in
Dudgeon did provide support in a small number of subsequent cases
originating from States that had not yet followed the prevailing trend,
namely, the cases of Norris v. Ireland0 and Modinos v. Cyprus.3 How-
ever, an approach whereby the Convention kicks in only to bring some
remaining States into line, is nothing to inspire great faith.32 Similarly,
in Sutherland and Mouta, the Commission and Court only recognized
28. See supra text accompanying note 15.
29. In areas concerning "public morals" arising under ECHR articles 8(2), 9(2), 10(2)
and 11(2), the Court has promulgated the "evolving consensus" doctrine within the broader
context of the "margin of appreciation" doctrine, particularly as expounded in Handyside v.
United Kingdom, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1976). See HARRIS ET AL., supra note 26, at 290-
96. In Handyside, the Court recognized States' prerogatives to reach their own determina-
tions about "moral" interests,
[I]t is not possible to find in the domestic law of the various Contracting States a
uniform European conception of morals. The view taken by their respective laws
of the requirements of morals varies from time to time and from place to place,
especially in our era which is characterised by a rapid and far-reaching evolution
of opinions on the subject. By reason of their direct and continuous contact with
the vital forces of their countries, State authorities are in principle in a better posi-
tion than the international judge to give an opinion on the exact content of these
requirements ....
24-Eur. Ct. H.R. at 22.
The comments made in this essay about the Court's application of the doctrines of
"dynamic interpretation" and "evolving consensus" thus apply more broadly to its applica-
tion of the margin of appreciation doctrine in areas concerning "public morals" under ECHR
article 8. ECHR, supra note 8, art. 8(2).
30. 142 Eur. Ct. H. R. (ser. A)(1988).
31. 259 Eur. Ct. H. R. (ser. A)(1993).
32. Harris, O'Boyle, and Warbrick entertain the opposite view, arguing that "the Court
does not necessarily wait until only the defendant state remains out of line before it recog-
nises a new standard." HARRIS ET AL., supra note 26, at 9. Even if that observation is true, it
hardly shows the "evolving consensus" doctrine to be progressive, as it adopts the lowest
possible benchmark of one last remaining State (or, reading more generously, a small hand-
ful of remaining States). The only example that the authors cite, Marckx v. Belgium,
concerns unwed mothers and children born out of wedlock, who by the 1970's hardly faced
the pariah status of earlier times, as the Court itself acknowledges. See 31 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser.
A) at para. 41 (1979); see also supra text accompanying note 12. The fact that the Court
applied the "evolving consensus" doctrine to issues such as these--even if, along with Bel-
gium, a handful of other States also still maintained legislation discriminating against unwed
mothers or children born out of wedlock-scarcely suggests that the doctrine has been used
progressively. If Marckx represents the most progressive application, then it is all the more
apparent that the doctrine is used more to confirm prevailing social norms than to challenge
them.
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sexual orientation as protected under article 14 after a significant num-
ber of Western European States had already introduced non-
discrimination legislation into their domestic laws.33 If United Nations
bodies should ever adopt such a doctrine, seeking favorable develop-
ments in a significant number of States before recognizing rights, sexual
minorities will have a long wait.34
Similarly, if we examine the cases that preceded B v. France, as
well as the developments since that case, we see that these doctrines'
adverse significance for sexual minorities extends to the Court's deci-
sions on transsexualism. Transsexuals are too few in number, too
isolated in society, too different in their concerns from the dominant gay
movement, 35 to form powerful movements or lobbies. Transsexuals are
the very model of the kinds of individuals who need the protections of a
human rights regime. However, in Rees v. United Kingdom36 and Cossey
v. United Kingdom,37 the Court, finding that the British government had
already allowed changes in some personal documents, declined to find
that the government was required to effectuate changes to birth certifi-
cates, despite the role of birth certificates in crucial spheres of life, such
as employment. It was only because the more integrated French system
of personal identification did not even allow partial changes that the
Court found in favor of the applicant in B v. France. Recent develop-
ments have confirmed the Court's reluctance to provide protections
precisely when they are most needed. In X, Y and Z v. United King-
dom,35 the Court declined to hold that the right to private and family life
under article 8 required that paternity be recognized for a post-operative
transsexual, notwithstanding overwhelming evidence of the applicant's
stable and longstanding family relationship with the children. In Shef-
field and Horsham v. United Kingdom,3 9 the Court reaffirmed its
findings in Rees and Cossey that Britain was under no obligation to pro-
vide greater legal recognition of the identities of post-operative
transsexuals. Despite the largely divergent results in the cases from
33. See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL LESBIAN AND GAY ASSOCIATION (ILGA), WORLD LEGAL SUR-
VEY, at http://www.ilga.org/Information/Legal survey/Europe/world legal survey__europe.htm
(last modified Aug. 3, 2000). See also PETER TATCHELL, EUROPE IN THE PINK (1992); Rob Tiel-
man & Hans Hammelburg, World Survey, in THE THIRD PINK BOOK 249 (ART HENDRICKS ET AL.,
EDS. 1993).
34. Of course, as suggested in Part II, there is good reason to believe that the "political"
human rights bodies at the United Nations have, in effect, adopted this attitude, albeit sub
silentio.
35. See, e.g., HEINZE, SEXUAL ORIENTATION, supra note I, at 56.
36. 106 Eur. Ct. H. R. (ser. A)(1986).
37. App. No. 10843/84, 13 Eur. H.R. Rep 622 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 1990).
38. 1997-II Eur. Ct. H. R. at 619 (1997).
39. 1998-V Eur. Ct. H.R. at 2011 (1998).
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Dudgeon to Mouta and Sheffield and Horsham, what unites all of them
is the Court's willingness to apply human rights only in ways that con-
firm some discernible status quo among a sufficient number of member
States.
Note that the European Convention represents only one regional
human rights system." Developments under other regional systems,
however, are hardly more promising. In view of the more fundamental
and systemic problems that have confronted the Inter-American 4' and
African 2 systems, frequently impairing the effective redress even of
massive and systemic violations of human rights, significant advances
for sexual minorities are unlikely in the foreseeable future.
B. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),'
too, includes a non-discrimination norm modeled on UDHR article 2.
ICCPR article 2(1) states:
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect
and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to
its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant,
without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, lan-
guage, religion, political or other opinion, national or social
origin, property, birth or other status.
Article 26 provides a further non-discrimination norm:
All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any
discrimination to the equal protection of the law. In this respect,
the law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all per-
sons equal and effective protection against discrimination on any
ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or
other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other
status.
40. For an overview of the regional human rights systems, see generally HENRY J.
STEINER & PHILIP ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT, ch. 10 (2nd ed.
2000).
41. See Tom Farer, The Rise of the Inter-American Human Rights Regime: No Longer a
Unicorn, Not Yet an Ox, in THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF HUMAN RIGHTS 32 (David J.
Harris & Stephen Livingstone, eds., 1998).
42. Chidi Anselm Odinkalu, The Individual Complaints Procedures of the African
Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights: A Preliminary Assessment, 8 TRANSNAT'L L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 359 (1998).
43. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, entered into force Mar. 23,
1976, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
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Unlike article 2(1), which provides for non-discrimination only with
regard to "the rights recognized in the present Convention," article 26
reaches considerably further, providing for "equal protection of the
law"-that is, arguably, of "all" law-within the jurisdictions of the
States Parties. 44
The ICCPR provided for the creation of the Human Rights Com-
mittee,45 whose functions include issuing comments on reports
submitted by States parties46 and examining individual complaints.
Like the Strasbourg bodies, the UN Human Rights Committee has found
the enumeration of categories in article 2(1) to be illustrative rather than
exhaustive, foreclosing any relegation of the "other status" clause to a
dead-letter status. 8
Also like the Strasbourg bodies, the Committee's initial disposition
towards gay rights was unfavorable.49 However, in Toonen v. Australid°
it found that a prohibition of consensual, adult homosexual conduct un-
der State laws of Tasmania violated the privacy right under article 17.'
Unlike the European Court in Dudgeon, the Committee did expressly
"not[e]" its view that the reference to the enumerated category of "sex"
in articles 2(1) and 26 included sexual orientation, 2 and, to be precise,
found a violation of article 17(1)juncto article 2(1)."3 In its more recent
comments on individual State reports, the Committee has cited ill-
44. See, e.g., Communication No. 172/1984: S.W.M. Broeks v. the Netherlands, U.N.
GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 30th Sess., Supp. No. 40, at 149, U.N. Doc. A/42/40 (1987). In
Broeks, the Committee stated that article 26 "does not merely duplicate the guarantees al-
ready provided for in article 2. It derives from the principle of equal protection of the law
without discrimination... which prohibits discrimination in law or in practice in any field
regulated and protected by public authorities." Id.; cf General Comment 18: Non-
Discrimination, U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 37th Sess., U.N. Doc. HRI\GEN\Il\Rev.I at
26 (1994) [hereinafter Non-Discrimination].
45. ICCPR, supra note 43, art. 28.
46. Id. at art. 40(4).
47. First Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
entered into force Mar. 23, 1976, 999 U.N.T.S. 302 [hereinafter First Optional Protocol].
48. Non-Discrimination, supra note 44, at 26.
49. See Communication No. R.14/61: Hertzenberg v. Finland, U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts.
Comm., 37th Sess., Supp. No. 40, U.N. Doc. A/37/40, Supp. No. 40, at 161 (1982)
(upholding Finland's prerogative to censor radio and television broadcasts dealing with les-
bian and gay issues).
50. Communication No. 488/1992: Toonen v. Australia, U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts.
Comm., U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/50/D/488/1992 (1994), reprinted in 1 INT'L HUM. RTS. REP. 97
(1994).
51. Article 17 provides that "no one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interfer-
ence with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his
honour and reputation." ICCPR, supra note 43, art. 17(1)
52. Toonen, supra note 50, at 105.
53. Id. at 105-06. But see id. at 106 (indiv. op. of Mr. Bertil Wennergren) (arguing that
the Tasmanian legislation also violated article 26).
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treatment of homosexuals as raising concerns about violations of the
Covenant.14 In view of its expansive interpretation of the scope of pro-
tected categories,55 there is good reason to believe that the Committee
will be generally willing to include sexual orientation as a protected
category.
But there is an important difference between the European Court
and the Human Rights Committee. The European Convention largely
dominates human rights activity within the Council of Europe, and the
Court now dominates the Convention 6 The Court's decisions are bind-
ing in international law,57 and the Court's jurisprudence increasingly
pervades the national law of member States.58 By contrast, the Human
Rights Committee, while highly respected,59 does not play such a central
role, either within the United Nations or within the national law of many
States Parties. Its sphere of activity is limited to the mandate of the
ICCPR, and its views, although highly persuasive, are not binding in
international law.60
More importantly, within the United Nations the Human Rights
Committee is but one of several prominent bodies specifically
responsible for the promotion of human rights, including the Human
Rights Commission, the Sub-Commission on the Promotion and
Protection of Human Rights (formerly the Sub-Commission on
Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities) and the
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, which largely
shape the UN human rights agenda and have failed to take meaningful
54. See, e.g., Concluding Observations on Colombia, U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm.,
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.75 para. 16 (1997).
55. See supra note 48.
56. That is, it dominates after the abolition of the Commission under Protocol 11. See
supra note 10.
57. ECHR, supra note 8, art. 46. But see HARRIS ET. AL., supra note 26, at 23-36
(noting the divergent effects of Court decisions within the domestic legal systems of the
States Parties).
58. See, e.g., P.W.C. AKKERMANS ET AL., GRONDRECHTEN: GRONDRECHTEN EN GRON-
DRECHTSBESCHERMING IN NEDERLAND 23 (1999) (noting the strong influence of the
Convention on domestic law in the Netherlands). But see VAN DIJK & VAN HOOF, supra note
9, at 16-18 (noting differences in the effects of Court decisions upon the domestic law the of
States Parties). See also HARRIS ET AL., supra note 26, at 23-36.
59. See, e.g., A.H. ROBERTSON & J.G. MERILLS, HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE WORLD 66-72
(4th ed. 1996).
60. See ICCPR, supra note 43, art. 40(4) (providing only that the Committee may pre-
pare and transmit "reports" and "general comments" on State submissions to those States and
to the Economic and Social Council). See also First Optional Protocol, supra note 47, art.
5(4) (providing only that the Committee may prepare and transmit "views" on individual
complaints to the State Party). Cf. ROBERTSON & MERRILLS, supra note 59, at 39-72.
61. Cf ROBERTSON & MERRILLS, supra note 59, at ch. 3; STEINER & ALSTON, supra
note 40, at 599-602.
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steps to recognize sexual minorities.62 Unlike the relatively "non-
political" character of the Human Rights Committee,63 these bodies are
more overtly "political." 6 Any evaluation of the status of sexual
minorities within the context of the United Nations must take the more
political bodies into account.
II. HUMAN RIGHTS BODIES AT THE UNITED NATIONS:
THE BROADER CONTEXT
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) of 194865 rep-
resented a decisive step in international law towards a comprehensive
catalogue of individual rights, as confirmed in 1966 through the adop-
tion of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR)6 and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights (ICESCR).67 These three instruments purport to set forth
interests of all human beings. In the following discussion, they will
therefore be called "general" instruments. Further general instruments
adopted in regional organizations included the European Convention on
Human Rights (ECHR),68 the American Declaration69 and American
62. See supra text accompanying note 2.
63. Under Article 28, Committee members are appointed not as representatives of their
States, but rather "in their personal capacity", as independent experts possessing "recognized
competence in the field of human rights [with] consideration being given to the usefulness of
some persons having legal experience." ICCPR, supra note 43, art. 28. It is generally ac-
cepted that most Committee members have maintained high standards of independence and
insulation from political pressures. See, e.g., STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 40, at 707.
64. The creation of a Human Rights Commission is directly authorized under Article 68
of the United Nations Charter, which does not require appointment of members in their per-
sonal capacities. Its members are government representatives, and, not confined, like the
Human Rights Committee, to the specific application of a treaty, has inevitably been subject
to political influence. The members of the Sub-Commission on Human Rights, by contrast,
are appointed in their personal capacity, and while having generally displayed greater inde-
pendence than the Commission members, have not been immune from political pressures.
While the creation of the office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, currently held
by former Irish President Mary Robinson, is perhaps still too recent to allow any clear as-
sessment, the high profile of the office holder also creates considerable pressure to avoid
controversial issues. For an overview of these three bodies, see ROBERTSON & MERRILLS,
supra note 59, at 78-95, 112-15; STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 40, at 599-602.
65. G.A. Res. 217A (III), UN Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948).
66. 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force, 23 Mar. 1976).
67. 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force, 3 Jan. 1976).
68. See ECHR, supra note 8, amended by Protocol No. 3 (1970), Protocol No. 5 (1971),
Protocol No. 8 (1990), and Protocol 11 (1998).
69. American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, O.A.S. Res. XXX, art. II
(1948), reprinted in BASIC DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE INTER-
AMERICAN SYSTEM, OEA/Ser.L.V/II.82 doc.6 rev.l at 17 (1992) [hereinafter American Dec-
laration].
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Convention on Human Rights70 and the African Charter on Human and
Peoples' Rights.' With the adoption of these general instruments, one
might have expected the process of international norm creation to have
been largely completed. The remaining work would consist of promot-
ing and interpreting them.
But something different happened. The idea that the interests of
all human beings could be written down on a few dozen pages was
soon found to be inadequate. Subsequent developments have moved
towards increasing recognition of human differences. In the same year
as the adoption of the ICCPR and ICESCR, the United Nations Gen-
eral Assembly also adopted the International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.72 Since that time,
instruments have been promulgated for distinct subjects of interna-
tional human rights law, such as women,73 minorities, children 7 the
disabled,6 or workers.77 Further, instruments have also been promul-
gated for purposes of focusing on specific kinds of rights or abuses,
including instruments on such matters as torture,78  slavery and
70. 1144 U.N.T.S. 123, art. 1(1) (entered into force 18 July 1978) [hereinafter American
Convention].
71. OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, art. 2 (entered into force 21 Oct. 1986)
[hereinafter African Charter].
72. 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (entered into force, 4 Jan. 1969) [hereinafter ICERD]. See also
Declaration on Race and Racial Prejudice, EICN.4/Sub.2/1982/2/Add.1, annex V (1982)
[hereinafter DRRP].
73. See, e.g., Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against
Women, Mar. 1, 1981, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 [hereinafter CEDAW]; Declaration on the Elimina-
tion of Violence Against Women, G.A. Res. 48/104,48 U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at
217, U.N. Doc. A/48/49 (1993) [hereinafter DEVAW].
74. See, e.g., Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic,
Religious or Linguistic Minorities, G.A. Res. 47/135, U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., Supp. No. 49,
at 210, UN Doc. A/47/49 (1993) [hereinafter Minority Rights].
75. See, e.g., Convention on the Rights of the Child, U.N. Doc. AIRES/44/22 (entered
into force Sept. 1, 1990) [hereinafter CRC]; Declaration on the Rights of the Child, G.A.
Res. 1386(XIV), U.N. GAOR, 14th Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 19, U.N. Doc. A/4354 (1959)
[hereinafter DRC].
76. See, e.g., Principles for the Protection of Persons With Mental Illnesses and the Im-
provement of Mental Health Care, G.A. Res. 46/119, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., Supp. No. 49,
at 189, U.N. Doc. A/461/49 (1991) [hereinafter PPPMI]; Declaration on the Rights of Dis-
abled Persons, G.A. Res. 3447(XXX), U.N. GAOR, 30th Sess., Supp. No. 34, at 88, U.N.
Doc. A/10034 (1975) [hereinafter RDP]; Declaration on the Rights of Mentally Retarded
Persons, G.A. Res. 2856(XXVI), U.N. GAOR, 26th Sess., Supp. (No. 29) at 93, U.N. Doc.
A/8429 (1971) [hereinafter DRMRP].
77. Employment Policy Convention (ILO No. 122), July 13, 1964, 569 U.N.T.S. 65.
78. See, e.g., Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, available at http://www.pch.gc.ca/ddp-hrd/english/
cat/cat.htm; Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 3452, U.N.
GAOR, 30th Sess., Supp. No. 34, at 91, U.N. Doe. A/10034 (1975).
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slave-like practices," or conditions of detention. ° We shall refer to
these as "special" instruments.8 Although regional human rights sys-
tems have also produced special instruments,82 United Nations human
rights bodies have been particularly active in promoting them.
A. The Dual Effect of Special Instruments
The proliferation of special instruments might appear to augur well
for sexual minorities. It might seem that, with the acknowledgment of
so many other interests, it can only be a matter of time before sexual
minorities get an instrument of their own. 83 Alternatively, one might
maintain that "a rising tide raises all ships": the progressive recognition
of ever more specialized interests must surely promote an overall cli-
mate of tolerance and broad-mindedness that will benefit sexual
minorities in the long run.
Yet the trend towards special instruments is a double-edged sword.
It indeed represents progress, for those who get one. At the same time,
despite the curious way in which the special instruments tirelessly
79. See, e.g., Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade,
and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery, entered into force Apr. 30, 1957, 226
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Slavery Supp.].
80. See, e.g., Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons Under Any Form of
Detention or Imprisonment, G.A. Res. 43/173, U.N. GAOR, 43rd Sess., Supp. No. 49, at
298, U.N. Doc. A/Res/43/173 (1988).
81. This distinction between the emergence of general and special instruments refers
only to a trend. It should not be taken to suggest that special instruments were unknown until
1966, as bilateral minority rights treaties have a long history. See PATRICK THORNBERRY,
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE RIGHTS OF MINORITIES, chs. 2-4 (1991). Similarly, well
before the United Nations came into being, the International Labor Organization had pro-
duced important multilateral instruments of special character. See, e.g., Slavery Convention,
Sept. 25, 1926, 46 Stat. 2183, 60 L.N.T.S. 253; Convention Converning Forced or Compul-
sory labour, June 28, 1930, 39 U.N.T.S. 55. However, before the advent of the Universal
Declaration, special instruments had served to address human rights issues in a world which
was not yet willing to accept general, universal human rights in international law, as wit-
nessed by the rejection of proposals to include human rights as binding provisions within the
United Nations Charter. See, e.g., ROBERTSON & MERRILLS, supra note 59, at 25-27. After
the adoption of the UDHR, ICCPR and ICESCR, special instruments played that role only in
the sense that they might be directed at States still not accepting the general ones. Increas-
ingly, the role of the special instruments would be not to anticipate general instruments, but
to supplement and indeed improve them.
82. See, e.g., European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or De-
grading Treatment or Punishment, entered into force Feb. 1, 1989, E.T.S. No. 126; Inter-
American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture, entered into force Feb. 28, 1997,
O.A.S. Treaty Series No. 67, OEA Ser.L.V/II.82 doc.6 rev. 1, reprinted in Basic Documents
Pertaining to Human Rights in the Inter-American System 83; African Charter on the Rights
and Welfare of the Child, O.A.U. Doc. CAB/LEG/24.9/49 (1990).
83. See HEINZE, SEXUAL ORIENTATION, supra note 1, at ch. 15.
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affirm the universal character of the general instruments, 1 it raises the
stakes for those who have no realistic hope of getting one. The factory-
like way in which international organizations now churn out specialized
instruments only reinforces the sense they are not hard to get. In the
crudest terms: anyone can get one, even common criminals.85 Each new
instrument has the-perhaps inadvertent, but nevertheless pernicious-
effect of underscoring the fact that sexual minorities still do not have
one. The longer sexual minorities fail to get one, the greater the suspi-
cion that there must be some good reason. In short, the increasing
inclusion of certain issues itself serves to highlight the continued exclu-
sion of sexual orientation.
An example of this process of inclusion-as-exclusion is found in the
genesis of the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action,86 adopted
upon conclusion of the Fourth World Conference on Women. Human
rights instruments have traditionally been drafted in very general lan-
guage. The Universal Declaration can be printed on a page or two; the
two 1966 Covenants are rather more detailed, but still remarkably brief
in view of their enormous substantive scope. By contrast, the Beijing
Declaration and Platform includes 346 detailed paragraphs, easily cov-
ering over 100 printed pages. Its aim is not to state norms in general
terms, but to set forth the problems of women in an exhaustive, indeed
definitive, statement.87
There was, however, one exception. Any mention of women's
problems arising from sexual orientation was expressly excluded, under
threats by States to refuse to endorse the document.88 While the drafting
histories (travaux preparatoires) of the leading human rights instru-
ments are merely inconclusive on the drafters' intentions relevant to
sexual orientation-not clearly alluding to it one way or the other-the
Beijing Declaration now delivers affirmative evidence that sexual mi-
norities are specifically meant to be excluded.89 With the Beijing
84. See, e.g., CRC, supra note 75, pmbl. para. 3; CEDAW, supra note 73, pmbl. para. 2;
DEVAW, supra note 73, pmbl. para. 2; DRMRP, supra note 76, pmbl. para. 3; DRC, supra
note 75, pmbl. para. 2; DRRP, supra note 76, pmbl. para. 6; ICERD, supra note 72, pmbl.
para. 2, art. 7; Minority Rights, supra note 74, pmbl. para. 3, art. 8(3); PPPMI, supra note
76, at I(5); Slavery Supp., supra note 79, pmbl. para. 2.
85. See supra note 80.
86. Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, Fourth World Conference on Women,
16th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/CONF.177/20 (1995), U.N. Doc. A/CONF.177/20.Add.1 (1995),
reprinted in 35 I.L.M. 401 (1995) [hereinafter Beijing Declaration].
87. See, e.g., id. paras. 22-34.
88. See Sanders et al., supra note 2.
89. Cf. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1964, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331,
art. 32 [hereinafter VCLT] (providing that records of preparatory work may be used as a
"supplementary" means of interpreting treaties). While a non-binding instrument such as the
Beijing Declaration is not subject to the stringent canons of interpretation applicable to trea-
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Declaration, the international human rights movement does not merely
give sexual minorities "nothing." It actively brands them as unsuitable
for human rights protections.
The parallel to the European Court's decisions in the transsexualism
cases is striking. The substantial line of failures of transsexuals before
the European Court (with the extremely limited exception of B. v.
France) does not leave transsexuals with a legal status quo. The Euro-
pean Court does not merely leave States free to refuse rights for
transsexuals. Rather, the Court repeatedly confirms that transsexuals do
not merit the full protections of the Convention's privacy, marriage or
non-discrimination rights. If no less authoritative a body than the Euro-
pean Court has reached such a conclusion, then States a fortiori can
deem themselves justified in reaching it. Transsexuals would not merely
be in the same position if the European Convention did not exist. Ar-
guably, they would be better off.
B. "Soft" Law
One objection to the thesis of inclusion-as-exclusion might be that it
places undue emphasis on written instruments. After all, such docu-
ments are mere pieces of paper. Rarely do they guarantee effective
implementation. There is arguably an indirect proportion between the
effectiveness of UN enforcement of its human rights instruments, and
the number of such instruments that it has generated. To see the prolif-
eration of special instruments as particularly significant is to exaggerate
their utility.
Yet that objection is unpersuasive. Questions of enforcement be-
come relevant only after there is agreement about the norms themselves.
It is true that UN enforcement of human rights standards has enjoyed
limited success.9° However, for the purposes of sexual minorities, our
first concern is with norm production-an activity in which interna-
tional organizations, and notably United Nations bodies, excel. Thus
Robertson and Merrills argue that, despite its unimpressive record of
supervision, "the United Nations has achieved a great deal in developing
the international law of human rights, particularly as regards interna-
tional standards, which are increasingly significant as conventional or
customary rules of law."9
ties, it certainly cannot be assumed a priori that a drafting history would be irrelevant to its
interpretation or application.
90. See supra text accompanying note 59; see also ROBERTSON & MERRILLS, supra note
5 9, at 115.
91. ROBERTSON & MERRILLS, supra note 59, at 114-15.
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The role of normative instruments within the leading international
organizations is particularly well illustrated through the concept of
"soft" law. "Soft" law is a new idea, largely the creature of post-World
War II international law and institutions. It refers to a process whereby
norms contained within resolutions adopted by international organiza-
tions-resolutions not in themselves legally binding-can nevertheless
come to acquire legal force, particularly when they are adopted by the
larger or more authoritative bodies, such as the General Assembly or the
Economic and Social Council.92 A prominent example is the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights.3
Such resolutions are ordinarily adopted by a majority rather than a
unanimity of States members. 9 Once an issue gets an instrument of its
own-despite the fact that significant numbers of States may have voted
against the instrument-that issue can steadily rise to the status of being
a generally recognized human rights concern. For example, the prob-
lems of indigenous and tribal peoples now count among the well-
recognized concerns of leading international human rights bodies, 9 al-
though only fourteen States96 have ratified the Convention on
Indigenous and Tribal Peoples, the text of which was adopted by the
International Labor Organization in 1989. 9' That reticence is all the
more puzzling, insofar as many States that do not have peoples recog-
nized as indigenous could become Parties to the Convention, thus
promoting the recognition of indigenous and tribal peoples without in-
curring obligations under it.9  The prominence of the issue on the human
rights agenda suggests that the Convention represents norms which have
acquired authoritative status merely through the-in itself, non-
binding-adoption99 of the Convention text by member States of the
92. See, e.g., PETER MALANCZUK, AKEHURST'S MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 54-55 (7th ed. 1997).
93. See, e.g., ROBERTSON & MERRILLS, supra note 59, at 29.
94. See, e.g., U.N. CHARTER, art. 18 (setting forth voting requirements for the General
Assembly) and art. 67 (setting forth voting requirements for the Economic and Social Coun-
cil).
95. See Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, E/CN.4/Sub.2/
1994/2/Add. 1 (June 8, 1994) (prepared by the Chair-Rapporteur of the Working Group on
Indigenous Populations). See also THORNBERRY, supra note 81, at chs. 38-41.
96. The States are Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Denmark, Ecuador, Fiji,
Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Paraguay, and Peru. See International
Labour Organization, Convention No. C169 Was Ratified by 14 Countries, http://
ilolex.ilo.ch:1567/scripts/ratifce.pl?C169 (last modified March 7, 2000).
97. See, e.g., Convention concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent
Countries (ILO No. 169), June 27, 1989, 72 INT'L LAB. ORG. 59 [hereinafter ITP].
98. The Netherlands, for example, which does not have any population recognized as
indigenous, ratified the treaty in 1998. See International Labour Organization, supra note 96.
99. Cf. VCLT, supra note 89, art. 9(2) (setting forth the means of adoption of a treaty at
an international conference), art. 24(2) (providing that, absent a contrary provision as set
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International Labor Organization (and the adoption of similar-in them-
selves non-binding-texts in the United Nations or in regional
bodies),' ° irrespective of the actual number of States that ultimately
consent to be bound.
Fourteen states-arguably more-could probably be found to ratify
a binding Convention guaranteeing at least basic civil rights and liber-
ties to sexual minorities,' ° ' even if some of them refused to include more
controversial norms, such as gay marriage. The provisions of such an
instrument would merely confirm that the standard civil rights and lib-
erties of the UDHR or ICCPR do indeed apply to sexual minorities.'O
Alternatively, a non-binding instrument could be proposed which, under
classical international legal principles, should pose no threat to unwill-
ing States.
Why, then, are no such instruments adopted? Arguably, because
those classical principles no longer prevail. Once such an instrument
exists, the prospect of its ripening into soft law means that it almost
does not matter which States did and did not originally favor it. With an
instrument of their own, sexual minorities would assume their place on
an internationally recognized human rights agenda. They would become
recognized subjects of international law. Of course, that is a step that the
Human Rights Committee, constrained by its mandate, cannot take. But
it is also a step which the more political UN bodies will not take. Why?
C. Local and Global
"A distinction must be drawn between homosexuals who are
such because of some kind of... pathological constitution
judged to be incurable, and those whose tendency comes from a
lack of normal sexual development .... [S]o far as the incur-
able category is concerned, the activities must be regarded as
abnormalities ......
"While considering the respect due to the private life of a ho-
mosexual... respect is also due to the people... who are
completely against unnatural immoral practices."
forth under art. 24(1), a treaty shall enter into force after all negotiating States have con-
sented to be bound), and art. II (setting forth the means by which States consent to be bound
by a treaty).
100. See Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, supra note 95.
101. In a recent report, Wintemute has identified more than 20 countries whose na-
tional laws expressly prohibit discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation. See
WINTEMUTE, supra note 27, at x-xi, 265-67 (supplement on file with author).
102. See HEINZE, SEXUAL ORIENTATION, supra note 1, at ch. 15.
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Who might have made such statements? Robert Mugabe? Mohatir
Mohammed?
In fact, they were made, respectively, by two human rights judges-
Judges Walsh'03 and Zekia °" of the European Court of Human Rights,
dissenting in Dudgeon. Those dissenting opinions have gone largely
unnoticed, as Mr. Dudgeon's comfortable victory (15 votes to 4), fol-
lowed by similar victories in Norris and Modinos, seems to suggest that
such views need no longer be taken seriously. In two senses, however,
such a conclusion would be a mistake. First, it cannot be assumed that
such views are now obsolete in Western Europe. In Mouta, the national
court (Tribunal da Relaqdo), in a 1996 judgment, had denied child cus-
tody to a homosexual father, reasoning as follows:
The child should live in ... a traditional Portuguese family,
which is certainly not the set-up her father has decided to enter
into, since he is living with another man ... It is not our task
here to determine whether homosexuality is or is not an illness
or whether it is a sexual orientation towards persons of the same
sex. In both cases it is an abnormality and children should not
grow up in the shadow of abnormal situations; such are the dic-
tates of human nature[,] and ... [the applicant] himself...
acknowledged this ... in stat[ing] that he had definitively left
the marital home to go and live with a boyfriend, a decision
which is not normal according to common criteria.°5
There is a more important sense, however, in which the views of
Judges Walsh and Zekia remain relevant. Their views are significant not
only within the jurisdictional bounds of the Council of Europe, but
rather as part of a wider, global controversy. Judge Zekia, for example,
writes,
Christian and Moslem religions are all united in the condemna-
tion of homosexual relations and of sodomy. Moral conceptions
to a great degree are rooted in religious beliefs.... [Both
Cyprus and Northern Ireland] are religious-minded and adhere
to moral standards which are centuries old.'O°
103. 45 Eur. Ct. H. R. (ser. A) at 43, para. 13 (1981).
104. Id. at 30, para. 3.
105. Mouta, App. No. 33290/96, at para. 14 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 1999), available at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/hudoc/ (last visited Mar. 2, 2001).
106. Id. at 30, para. 3.
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Today, there are still many legislatures and courts throughout the
world in which such a view would be embraced.' °7 Although the contro-
versy between normative universality and cultural relativism is more
commonly associated with a confrontation between Western and non-
Western cultures,' 8 Dudgeon and Mouta show how, within the bounda-
ries of Western Europe, the same kinds of arguments emerge which
would be voiced in many non-Western jurisdictions.' 9 Even on what
appear to be "deeply moral," "deeply religious," or "culturally specific"
issues, differences between Western and non-Western approaches
should not be exaggerated.
Placing Judge Zekia's views within that more global perspective, it
would seem that we should now understand why United Nations bodies
resist recognizing sexual minorities. After all, is it not true that much of
the world continues to adhere to ancient moral and religious codes
which are hostile to minority sexual identities such as homosexuality,
transgenderism or transsexuality? Would it not be "cultural imperial-
ism" to disregard such beliefs?
D. Sexuality: Then and Now
No sexual identity or relationship exists in abstraction from a wider
social context. Scholars setting out to study sexual norms have inevita-
bly had to examine entire systems of family and social organization,
including such factors as class structure, gender roles, courtship, mar-
riage or child rearing."' It is not uncommon for the social arrangements
of a given period to be characterized as "ancient"-as having always
and ever been as they are. For example, Cotterrell notes how claims
about "ancient" legal rules have commonly turned out to date back no
further than two or three generations."' Similarly, history suggests that
107. For comprehensive and periodically updated accounts, see ILGA, World Legal
Survey, supra note 33. See also Tielman & Hammelburg, supra note 33.
108. See Ludger Kuhnhardt, Die Universalitit der Menschenrechte (1987). For a useful
overview, see also STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 40, at chs. 5, 6.
109. Cf Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 192 (1986) (White, J.) (claiming that
Western prohibitions of homosexuality have "ancient roots"). Cf. also HEINZE, SEXUAL
ORIENTATION, supra note 1, at 181 n.73. But see Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996)
(striking down an amendment to a state constitution prohibiting the extension of legal pro-
tections to individuals based on sexual orientation).
110. See, e.g., GISELA BLEIBTREU-EHRENBERG, HoMOSEXUALITAT: DIE GESCHICHTE
EINES VORURTEILS (1981); JOHN BOSWELL, SAME-SEX UNIONS IN PREMODERN EUROPE
(1994) [hereinafter BOSWELL, SAME-SEX UNIONS]; JOHN BOSWELL, CHRISTIANITY, SOCIAL
TOLERANCE AND HOMOSEXUALITY (1980) [hereinafter BOSWELL, CHRISTIANITY]; J.K. Do-
VER, GREEK HOMOSEXUALITY (1989); SUSANNE FRAYSER, VARIETIES OF SEXUAL
EXPERIENCE (1985); DAVID GREENBERG, THE CONSTRUCTION OF HOMOSEXUALITY (1988).
Ill. ROGER COTTERRELL, THF POLITICS OF JURISPRUDENCE 27 (1989).
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personal identities and relationships, and the norms governing them,
have been in flux throughout time and across cultures."2
How, then, are we to interpret what, until the post-World War II pe-
riod, appears to have been the conspicuous lack of norms hospitable to
minority sexual identities? How shall we construe the often-heard
claims that such identities are "un-Asian," "un-African," "un-Islamic"?
Is President Daniel arap Moi of Kenya not right to claim that
"[h]omosexuality is against African norms and traditions?""3
If minority sexual identities are situated within the larger context of
individual freedom to make choices about sexual conduct or expression,
then such claims are, in an important sense, valid. For example, by defi-
nition, identities specifically linked to technological intervention, such
as advanced gender modification, would be new for many non-Western
societies just as they are rather new in the West. More broadly, identi-
ties strongly associated with individual "lifestyle choices" are new to
societies that have long adhered to arranged marriages, or in which gen-
der differentials remain strongly defined. D'Emilio argues that a gay
identity-in the sense of a distinct lifestyle choice, forming the basis of
a sociopolitical movement-only emerged in the West during the peri-
ods of 19th and 20th century industrialization and urbanization, which
accompanied the decline of the family as an economic unit, and the
emergence of individuals able to make personal choices about family
and social arrangements, free of the watchful eye of a closely knit
community.'
That observation cannot be limited to homosexuality. Those same
historical developments gave rise to what can be called "lifestyle
heterosexuality," in which marriage and family have come to be based
more on individual choice than on parental or community dictates, and
which, historically, is no more familiar in many cultures than lifestyle
homosexuality or other comparable-in the sense of being individually
adopted-identities or relationships. Within the framework of individuals
as free agents making autonomous choices, the heterosexual identity is
just as novel as homosexual, transgender, transsexual or other identities."'
112. See works cited supra note 110.
113. See ILGA, World Legal Survey, supra note 33, at http://www.ilga.org/
Information/egal-survey/afica/kenya.htm.
114. John D'Emilio, Capitalism and Gay Identity, in MAKING TROUBLE: ESSAYS ON
GAY HISTORY, POLITICS, AND THE UNIVERSITY 3 (1992).
115. Note, however, that we should not confuse the ideal of personal freedom promised
by liberalism with the actual personal freedom enjoyed by individuals in liberal society.
Simone de Beauvoir documented the increased capacity for individual choice delivered by
post-industrial society, while expressing doubt about whether the relaxation of formal, legal
constraints inevitably entailed a lifting of constraining social norms. See, e.g., 2 SIMONE DE
BEAUVOIR, LE DEUXItME SEXE pt. 3 (1949). Her 1943 work L'Invitde documents lifestyle
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Concepts like "homosexuality," "transgenderism" or "transsexualism" do
not emerge against the background of some constant and eternal
"heterosexuality"; such concepts arose simultaneously, each with
reference to the other, within the newly emerged social scientific
discourses of the 19th century."6 A genuinely "scientific" discourse of
sexuality had to strip away the layers of social factors-wealth, class,
religion, status-until the only factor which remained was biological
sex: marriage became scientifically meaningful not as a union of
aristocrat with aristocrat, of Catholic with Catholic, of worker's child
with worker's child, but only as a union of male and female, only as a
biological (i.e., "heterosexual") union. Any other kind of relationship, or
identity, became constructed with reference to that one.
Despite this parallel emergence of the concept of heterosexuality
with that of other sexual identities, there is a world of difference in the
moral consequences that have become attached to such terms. With re-
gard to heterosexual identity, moral or religious resistance against the
shift toward more liberal values may sometimes be fierce, but never
challenges heterosexuality as such. Persons making socially deviant
heterosexual choices may be accused of disobedience to elders, loose
morals, sinful conduct, but not of heterosexuality as such. By contrast,
with regard to sexual minorities, resistance against a freely chosen
identity, relationship or lifestyle is articulated as a rejection of those
minority identities as such. In a word, heterosexuals are immoral de-
spite their sexual orientation; sexual minorities are immoral because of
it. A gaping divide arises between the evils of heterosexuals and the evil
of homosexuality, of transgenderism, of transsexualism.
But if the concept of heterosexuality is as much of an historical con-
struction as any other sexual category, then what came before it?
While we cannot overlook theories of social constructionism, nor
should we exaggerate them. Social constructionism does not postulate a
prior Rousseauvian state of untarnished human society which
"civilization" then comes along to corrupt. There never was an Arcadian
golden age in which anyone could freely engage in mutually satisfying
sexual relations with anyone else. The 19th century construction of sex-
ual categories marked not a "clean break" in history, but a shift in
emphasis. In the norms governing sexual conduct, biological sex has
always played a prominent role-but alongside such equally prominent
factors as class, status, wealth or religion."7 Only since the 19th century
heterosexuality not as a haven of individual choice, but as a minefield of interpersonal power
relationships. SEE SIMONE DE BEAUVOIR, L'INVIT9E (1943).
116. MICHEL FOUCAULT, HISTOIRE DE LA SEXUALITI I: LA VOLONT9 DE SAVOIR (1976).
117. See works cited supra note 110.
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has there emerged such a detailed epistemology of sexual conduct that
is so thoroughly cleansed of those other factors, and thus so strongly
focused on biological sex.
While pre-liberal discourses of sexuality do indeed refer to biologi-
cal sex, that is not where all emphasis lies. In Plato's Athens, while
distinctions were indeed drawn, for example, between same-sex and
opposite-sex partners, sexual norms were dictated largely by the status
of male heads of households, and by their assertion of that role through
their sexual activity. The roles of other individuals, male or female,
were defined largely with reference to the role of those males.'8 Simi-
larly, the role of the Native American berdache"9 or the Indian hijra'2°
did represent respected non-"heterosexual" identities. However, in no
sense did those identities reflect versions of a 20th century transgender
or homosexual lifestyle choice. Norms governing the behavior of ber-
daches or hijras were not "liberal": they were constrained by prevailing
community expectations governing, for example, conduct, dress, or di-
vision of labor.'2' But so were the norms governing all individuals in the
same societies at the same times: sexual identity was subject to rules
and restrictions not because it was "transgender," "homosexual," or
"heterosexual," but because it was sexual. All known societies have
regulated sexual identity and conduct, be it through formal law or
through social norms.1
2 2
Yet we still have not answered the question: Why until recent times
have non-heterosexual identities been so widely condemned? And how
are intergovernmental organizations responding?
E. Two More Commodities in the Global Marketplace:
"Tradition" and "Sensitivity"
The first global sexual revolution did not occur in the 1960's. It oc-
curred from the 16th through 19th centuries, through European
colonialism. Germane to the depiction of colonized peoples as savages
was the depiction of their sexuality, including, in many cases, same-sex
or transgender practices, as sinful, primitive, or bestial. Native inhabi-
tants of Asia, Africa, and the Americas were burned, tortured or
118. See Dover, supra note 110.
119. David Greenberg, Why Was the Berdache Ridiculed?, in ANTHROPOLOGY AND
HOMOSEXUAL BEHAVIOR 179 (Evelyn Blackwood, ed., 1985).
120. S. Nanda, The Hijras of India: Cultural and Individual Dimensions of an Institu-
tionaliszed Third Gender Role, IN ANTHROPOLOGY AND HOMOSEXUAL BEHAVIOR 35 (Evelyn
Blackwood, ed., 1985).
121. See Greenberg, supra note 119, at 179; Nanda, supra note 120, at 35.
122. Cf, e.g., Frayser, supra note 110 and Greenberg, supra note 110 (noting the range
and changing nature of sexual norms and behaviors across societies and historical periods).
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punished for "deviant" and "sinful" sexual practices during the 16th and
17th centuries. Subsequent attempts to "mainstream" colonized peoples,
enduring into the 20th century, included the thoroughgoing eradication
of "un-Christian" social and sexual norms.'2 3
The human rights movement has taken inconsistent positions to-
wards this history. One of the defining features of the post-World War
II human rights movement has been its mission to dismantle vestiges of
European colonialism, notably in Asia and Africa.' 24 Preliminary docu-
ments to the drafting of the African Charter on Human and People's
Rights refer to European colonialism and racism largely to the exclusion
of other forms of oppression.2 '
Yet today, in defense of discrimination against sexual minorities, a
characterization of, for example, homosexual conduct as "un-African"
or "un-Asian" is promoted by political 61ites in non-Western States rou-
tinely relying upon European colonial statutes. For example, Kenya and
Singapore-whose peoples had no relevant contacts with each other in
pre-colonial history-both maintain 19th century penal codes prohibit-
ing "carnal knowledge against the order of nature.' 26 Carnal
knowledge? Against the order of nature? Such a vocabulary has more to
do with Victorian readings of the Old Testament Sodom and Gomorrah
story 12 than with anything that can clearly be called "traditional African
values" or "traditional Asian values." Similar statutes abound in post-
colonial States. 28 20th century Marxist movements disseminated a com-
parable global influence. While some early Marxists had in fact been
favorable to the abolition of discriminatory laws and practices, the post-
Stalinist period promoted ideals of national-sexual-purity through a
123. HEINZE, SEXUAL ORIENTATION, supra note 1, at 37-39, 42-44.
124. E.g., Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and
Peoples, G.A. Res. 1514 (XV), U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 66, U.N. Doc.
A/4682. See also DRRP, supra note 76, pmbl. para. 11; ICERD, supra note 72, pmbl. para 4.
125. See Declaration and Resolutions of the First Conference of Independent African
States (1958), Resolutions of the Second Conference of African States (1960), and Resolu-
tions of the First Assembly of the Heads of State and Government of the Organization of
African Unity (1964), reprinted in BASIC DOCUMENTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS 540-50 (lan
Brownlie, ed., 3rd ed. 1992).
126. See, e.g., Unnatural Offences, 2 LAWS OF KENYA § 162 (1985) Unnatural Offences
9 STATUTES OF THE REPUBLIC OF SINGAPORE § 377 (1986).
127. Genesis 18:16-19:29; cf. BOSWELL, CHRISTIANITY, supra note 110 supra, at 94-
95.
128. See, e.g., Maintenance Orders, I LAWS OF BECHUANLAND ch. 8, § 1 (1958)
(Botswana); Loitering or Soliciting for the Purposes of Prostitution, 2 LAWS OF FIJi ch. 16,
§ 168 (1978); Suspicious Premises, 2 LAWS OF Fiji ch. 16, § 169 (1978); Of Unnatural
Offences, INDIAN PEN. CODE ch. 16, § 377; MALAYSIAN PEN. CODE, § 377; PAKISTANI PEN.
CODE § 377; SYRIAN PEN. CODE § 520. Cf. HEINZE, SEXUAL ORIENTATION, supra note 1, at
15-16.
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discourse of homosexuality as Western "bourgeois decadence."'2 9 Gone
is the language of "carnal knowledge." Instead we find, for example,
homosexuality punishable in Mozambique with up to 3 years' impris-
onment and hard labor for purposes of "re-education.' 3°
We should neither underestimate nor overestimate the significance
of such laws. Again, we must not make the mistake of assuming that
they were imposed upon civilizations which had earlier been havens of
sexual freedom. In a sense, such laws might merely have been substi-
tuting some forms of sexual oppression with other forms-many of
which can barely be known, due to lack of adequate historical records.
However, when post-colonial political dlites speak of their pre-colonial
ancestors as having categorically condemned homosexuality or trans-
genderism, they perpetuate the selfsame colonial worldview they accuse
Europeans of having imposed. The notion of minority sexual orientation
as "un-African" or "un-Asian" is the embodiment of European-style
racism, for it does exactly what Europeans were accused of doing: it
ignores the histories of thousands of different African and Asian peo-
ples, throughout thousands of years of history, each with their own
changing patterns of social and sexual norms.' It perpetuates the dis-
tinctly colonial idea that Africans or Asians are all alike, that their pre-
colonial existence was frozen in time.1
32
When President Daniel arap Moi proclaims that "words like lesbi-
anism and homosexuality do not exist in African languages," he is right.
Nor did those terms-bastardized derivatives from ancient Greek
("hetero-," "homo-") and Latin (e.g., "sexual") 13 --exist in European
languages before the 19th century. He forgets, however, that his concept
of "African languages" and "African norms and traditions," as sharing
some intrinsic unity, would have been equally alien to pre-colonial Af-
rica. Moi also asserts that "even in religion [homosexuality] is
considered a great sin." '34 Yet, throughout its history, African peoples
have known thousands of normative systems'3-which, for lack of a
better word, we can denominate with the (also rather Western) term
"religions."' 36 Moi's claim only begs the question: Which religion? (It
also raises questions about the origins of the concept of "great sin.")
129. HEINZE, SEXUAL ORIENTATION, supra note 1, at 4-5.
130. MOZAMBICAN PEN. CODE, §§ 70, 71.
131. See, e.g., GREENBERG, supra note 110, chs. 2-5.
132. Cf. FITZPATRICK, supra note 4.
133. See, e.g., BOSWELL, SAME-SEX UNIONS, supra note 110, at 42-43.
134. See supra note 13.
135. See, e.g., NINIAN SMART, THE WORLD'S RELIGIONS ch. 13 (1989).
136. See, e.g., id. at 10-11 (noting the ambiguity of the term "religion" across cultures).
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In October 1999, Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni ordered po-
lice to "look for homosexuals, lock them up and charge them."'37 In a
public statement, he claimed that "[t]he Bible spells . . . out clearly that
God created Adam and Eve as wife and husband, but not men to marry
men."'' Traditional "African" values? Zimbabwean President Robert
Mugabe, too, asserts that "[hiomosexuality is against all the norms of
African society and culture. We don't believe they have any rights at
all."'" Mugabe paints a picture of African purity against the backdrop of
Western decadence: "Let them be gay in the United States, Europe and
elsewhere. They shall be sad people here."'40 The irony is that, in the late
20th century, Western societies have liberalized sexual norms, with 19th
century colonial laws or moral codes then being invoked by non-
Western States as evidence of "ancient traditions" in campaigns against
Westernization. It is perhaps no coincidence that, looking beyond dis-
courses of racial purity and impurity, the post-apartheid South African
constitution is also the first African instrument to prohibit discrimina-
tion on the basis of sexual orientation.
4'
In global venues such as the United Nations, Western societies
show nothing like the enthusiasm with which they promoted the dis-
mantling of colonial influences linked to racism. '4 Quite the contrary:
knowing nothing about such States' "ancient traditions," Western States
remain silent in order to show cross-cultural "sensitivity." Hence a
global normative code in which racism has long been viewed as a perni-
cious effect of European imperialism, while discrimination against
sexual minorities arises from "delicate," "ancient traditions" that require
special deference. The result is commodious all around: We'll pretend
to have ancient traditions, you'll pretend to respect them.
Yet the contemporary discourses of race and sexual orientation are
both largely products of 19th century, European social science."3 The
137. Chris McGreal, Gays are Main Evil, Say African Leaders, DAILY MAIL & GUARDIAN
(Johannesburg), Oct. 10, 1999, reprinted in ILGA, World Survey, supra note 33, at
http://www.ilga.org/Information/Legal-survey/africa/supporting%20files/gays-are-mainevil.h
tm (last modified Aug. 3, 2001).
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. See also Lewis Machipsa, Mugabe Swipes at Churches and Gays, DAILY MAIL
& GUARDIAN(Johannesburg), Dec. 9, 1998, available at http://www.mg.co.za/mg/news/
98decl/9dec-zim-wcc.html (noting Mugabe's frequent condemnation of gays and lesbians,
whom he has described as "lower than pigs and dogs.") Such statements coincide remarkably
with depictions in the Chinese press of homosexuality (tongxinglain) as a "foreigners' dis-
ease." See Tielman & Hammelburg, supra note 33, at 269.
141. S.A. CONST. ch. 2, § 9, para. 3.
142. See generally Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries
and Peoples, supra note 124.
143. See Heinze, Construction, supra note 1.
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histories of race in the American South or of apartheid in South Africa,
not to mention the history of gender in any number of cultures, suggest
that discrimination on grounds of race, ethnicity or gender have been
just as fiercely bound to "deeply held" moral and religious beliefs as
any norms governing sexual orientation. International condemnation of
such discrimination-however deeply rooted it may have been in relig-
ious convictions-has nevertheless taken top priority in United Nations
human rights bodies.'" Never did those bodies take the position that, for
example, racial discrimination merely represents a given society's
unique or sacred values, which should not be judged from outside; and
moral or religious objections to women's rights did not prevent the
drafting of the longest international human rights instrument in history,
the Beijing Declaration, accompanied by ongoing UN efforts to realize
their normative ideals in practice.
CONCLUSION
Through the proliferation of newly recognized human rights issues,
international organizations promote discrimination against sexual mi-
norities, by forever re-confirming that sexual minorities are not
included, because of the "delicate" issues which they represent. Sexual
orientation becomes the bargaining chip par excellence in the negotia-
tion between global human rights and cross-cultural "sensitivity."
However, issues arising around race, ethnicity, religion, gender and sex-
ual orientation are equally simple or complex; equally rational or
irrational; equally well or ill-suited to legal regulation; equally contin-
gent upon, or independent of, moral and religious concerns. The idea
that highly detailed, global agendas are imperative for issues of race,
ethnicity, religion or gender, but distinctly "complex" for questions of
sexual orientation, merely becomes a pretext for maintaining sexual ori-
entation in a permanent state of moral-dilemma-beyond-law.
144. See sources cited supra note 125.
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